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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 000727

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2013

TAGS: [PREL](#) [UNSC](#) [I2](#)

SUBJECT: UN/IRAQ: NO VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION; SUBDUED COUNCIL

REF: A. USUN 716

[1](#)B. USUN 637

CLASSIFIED BY: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT; REASONS:

1.5 (B) AND (D).

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY: A SUBDUED SECURITY COUNCIL MET IN INFORMALS ON MARCH 17 TO RECEIVE WORD THAT THE U.S., UK, AND SPAIN HAD CHOSEN NOT TO BRING THEIR RESOLUTION TO A VOTE, BUT WOULD INSTEAD "RESERVE THEIR RIGHT TO TAKE THEIR OWN STEPS TO SECURE THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ." SYG ANNAN AND MOST COUNCIL MEMBERS EXPRESSED SADNESS AND FRUSTRATION THAT A COMPROMISE COULD NOT BE REACHED. UNMOVIC EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN BLIX ANNOUNCED THE UNMOVIC WORK PROGRAM WITH ITS KEY REMAINING DISARMAMENT TASKS (KRDTs) WOULD BE READY THE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 17. ANNAN ANNOUNCED THE SUSPENSION OF ALL UN OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL UN PERSONNEL. RUSSIA, DRAWING FROM THE MARCH 15 RUSSIAN - FRENCH - GERMAN DECLARATION (REF A), PUSHED FOR A COUNCIL MEETING ON WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, TO DISCUSS APPROVAL OF THE WORK PROGRAM AND KRDTs. MOST COUNCIL MEMBERS (EVEN THE THREE AFRICAN STATES WHOSE FMS WILL BE IN NEW YORK ON TUESDAY, MARCH 18 FOR AN UNRELATED MEETING) HEDGED ON MINISTERIAL ATTENDANCE. THE RUSSIANS MAY CONTINUE TO PROBE FOR POTENTIALLY PROBLEMATIC AREAS, BUT HAVE NOT AS YET SURFACED A RESOLUTION PUSHING FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ADOPT THE WORK PROGRAM. IN ADDITION, RUSSIAN PERMREP LAVROV SEEMED RESIGNED TO THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION, AND SOUGHT TO MINIMIZE DIFFERENCES, UNLIKE HIS FRENCH AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES.

[1](#)2. (C) GERMAN AND FRENCH PERMREPS BOTH PUSHED BACK ON THE U.S. - UK - SPANISH EXPLANATION REGARDING THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, ASSERTING THAT THE RESOLUTION WOULD NOT HAVE HAD BACKING FROM THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL, AND MEXICAN PERMREP AGUILAR-ZINSER OUTLINED (AGAIN) MEXICO'S POSITION THAT USE OF FORCE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION WAS A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. CHILE WAS ONLY SLIGHTLY LESS UNHELPFUL, ASSERTING THAT INSPECTIONS WERE WORKING AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED; THE AFRICAN STATES COLLECTIVELY WERE LESS CONTENTIOUS, FOCUSING INSTEAD ON THE FAILURE OF THE COUNCIL TO ACHIEVE UNITY. FINALLY, PAKISTANI PERMREP AKRAM CAREFULLY AVOIDED SAYING MUCH THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED IN EITHER DIRECTION. COUNCIL MEMBERS ALL STOOD BEHIND SYG ANNAN'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW UN PERSONNEL, NOTING THAT THE DECISION WAS MADE IN THE INTEREST OF THEIR SAFETY. LAVROV LAID A MARKER THAT THE COUNCIL DID NOT "SUPPORT" THE SYG'S DECISION BUT RATHER "NOTED" IT, AS THE PHRASEOLOGY TO BE USED IN ANY STATEMENT TO THE PRESS TO BE MADE BY THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT (GUINEA). END SUMMARY.

UK: ACTION ON UNSCR IS OFF; IRAQ CAN STILL ACT

[1](#)3. (C) AFTER ANNOUNCING TO THE PRESS THE CO-SPONSORS' DECISION NOT TO CALL FOR A VOTE ON THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION (REF B), UK PERMREP GREENSTOCK CONVEYED THE SAME MESSAGE IN SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS. HE SPECIFIED THAT THE CO-SPONSORS HAD NOT ACTUALLY WITHDRAWN IT AS HAD BEEN MISREPORTED IN THE PRESS. HE REITERATED THAT THE RESOLUTION REMAINS ON THE TABLE. GREENSTOCK SAID THE UK HAD HELD

INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT COUNCIL CONSENSUS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IN LINE WITH RESOLUTION 1441. HE EXPLAINED THAT "ONE COUNTRY IN PARTICULAR HAS UNDERLINED ITS INTENTION TO VETO ANY ULTIMATUM 'NO MATTER WHAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES.'" GREENSTOCK CONTINUED THAT THAT COUNTRY (NOTE: FRANCE. END NOTE.) "REJECTED OUR COMPROMISE PROPOSAL BEFORE EVEN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT ITSELF AND HAS PUT FORWARD SUGGESTIONS THAT WOULD ROW BACK ON THE UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT OF THE COUNCIL IN 1441 - THOSE SUGGESTIONS WOULD AMOUNT TO NO ULTIMATUM, NO PRESSURE, AND NO DISARMAMENT." HE SAID THAT "THE CO-SPONSORS RESERVE THEIR RIGHT TO TAKE THEIR OWN STEPS TO SECURE THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ."

¶4. (C) GREENSTOCK SAID, IN THE VIEW OF HMG, IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO DEMONSTRATE HE HAD MADE THE STRATEGIC DECISION TO DISARM AND CALLED FOR IRAQ TO TAKE THE APPROPRIATE STEPS. HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN UNMOVIC PRESENTING ITS WORK PROGRAM AND KRDTs TO THE COUNCIL, SAYING THAT THE UK WAS OPEN TO DISCUSSIONS ON ITS PROVISIONS. GREENSTOCK WARNED THAT ANY PROGRESS ON THE WORK PROGRAM OR THE KRDTs WAS PREDICATED ON OVERALL IRAQI COOPERATION. HE SAID THAT THE UK ATTORNEY GENERAL HAD JUST RELEASED A RULING ON THE LEGALITY OF ACTION AGAINST IRAQ AND THAT THE UK MISSION WOULD DISTRIBUTE THAT RULING TO COUNCIL MEMBERS. GREENSTOCK RESERVED THE UK'S POSITION ON ATTENDING THE PROPOSED MINISTERIAL BUT, IN THE EVENT FS STRAW DID COME, HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ARRIVE UNTIL WEDNESDAY.

U.S.: RESOLUTION IS OFF; UNMOVIC AND IAEA OUT

¶5. (C) AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE SUPPORTED GREENSTOCK'S EXPLANATION OF ACTION ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. HE REGRETTED THAT, IN THE FACE OF A CERTAIN VETO THREAT, THAT THERE WAS NO PURPOSE IN PURSUING THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ANY FURTHER.

¶6. (C) AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE THEN EXPLAINED CALLS HE AND OTHER USG OFFICIALS HAD MADE TO UNMOVIC AND THE IAEA ON MARCH 16, SAYING THAT THE U.S. HAD PROMISED THE UN THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE ADVANCE WARNING WHEN IT WAS TIME TO WITHDRAW INSPECTORS FROM IRAQ. HE SAID THE U.S. HAD ASKED THE WEAPONS INSPECTORS TO TAKE "EXPEDITIOUS ACTION" TO SUSPEND THEIR OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND TO REMOVE ALL PERSONNEL FROM THE COUNTRY. AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE SAID THAT THE WARNING DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT WAR WAS IMMINENT, BUT THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE FURTHER WARNINGS.

BLIX: WORK PROGRAM READY; DETAILS ON WORK

¶7. (C) UNMOVIC EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN BLIX EXPLAINED THAT COPIES OF THE DRAFT WORK PROGRAM WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN THE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 17. BLIX REVIEWED THE REQUIREMENTS BEHIND THE WORK PROGRAM AND KRDTs, AND SAID THE "CLUSTER" DOCUMENT DELIVERED ON MARCH 7 HAD OUTLINED THE RANGE OF DISARMAMENT ISSUES. THE WORK PROGRAM WOULD CONTAIN 12 KEY REMAINING DISARMAMENT TASKS, ALONG WITH DETAILS OF HOW UNMOVIC INTENDED TO GO ABOUT ITS WORK.

¶8. (C) BLIX CONTRASTED THE KRDTs WITH VARIOUS COUNCIL "BENCHMARK" PROPOSALS, SAYING THAT UNMOVIC DID NOT USE THE TERM BENCHMARKS. BLIX THOUGHT THE VALUE OF BENCHMARKS, SUCH AS THOSE PROPOSED LAST WEEK BY THE UK, RESIDED IN THEIR ABILITY TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AMONG THOSE CONCERNED ABOUT IRAQ'S WMD PROGRAMS. BLIX SAID UNMOVIC'S ROLE IN A BENCHMARK-BASED EXERCISE WOULD BE TO REPORT BACK ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN A GIVEN PERIOD OF TIME. HE ALSO CLARIFIED THAT DISCUSSION OF A 120-DAY TIME PERIOD FOR UNMOVIC REFERRED TO UNSCR 1284-BASED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, AND WAS NOT NECESSARILY LINKED TO THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE TO DISARM IRAQ, WHICH HE REPEATED WOULD TAKE "NOT DAYS, NOT YEARS, BUT MONTHS."

¶9. (C) BLIX TOUCHED ON CHALLENGES IN ASSESSING PROGRESS IN VARIOUS AREAS. MISSILES COULD BE VERIFIED AS THEY WERE DESTROYED - HE NOTED THAT 70 OF THE AL-SAMOUD MISSILES HAD

BEEN DESTROYED SO FAR - AND THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTATION ON UAVS SHOULD BE RELATIVELY EASY TO DELIVER. HOWEVER, IN THOSE CASES WHERE THERE WAS A QUESTION OF WHETHER THE IRAQIS ACTUALLY HAD A SYSTEM - E.G., ANTHRAX OR MOBILE CW OR BW LABS - THE SITUATION WOULD BE MORE COMPLICATED. IF THE IRAQIS ACTUALLY HAD THE SYSTEM, THEN IT SHOULD BE A RELATIVELY STRAIGHTFORWARD TASK TO TURN THE ITEMS OVER. HOWEVER, IF THEY DID NOT HAVE THE SYSTEMS, THEY WOULD FACE A FAR MORE CHALLENGING TASK IN ASSEMBLING THE DOCUMENTATION PROVING THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE, OR NEVER HAD, A PARTICULAR SYSTEM. BLIX SAID THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN "PRO-ACTIVE" IN PROVIDING DOCUMENTS RECENTLY ON VX AND ANTHRAX, BUT THAT HE AWAITED UNMOVIC'S ANALYSIS BEFORE PRONOUNCING ON THE PAPERS THEMSELVES.

¶10. (C) BLIX NOTED THE CALLS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIALS URGING UNMOVIC WITHDRAWAL, AND SAID HE WOULD WAIT FOR THE SYG'S JUDGMENT.

SYG: UN OPERATIONS SUSPENDED; PERSONNEL OUT

¶11. (C) SYG ANNAN ANNOUNCED THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS:

-- ALL UN HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM IRAQ. (NOTE: WHILE THE SYG DID NOT PROVIDE A TIMELINE, A PARTICIPANT IN THE MEETING WHERE THE SYG MADE THE DECISION SAID THE UN WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF 24 TO 48 HOURS. END NOTE.)

-- WITHDRAWAL OF UN PERSONNEL FROM IRAQ WOULD INCLUDE CONTRACTORS FROM COTECNA AND SAYBOLT (NOTE: AUTHENTICATORS OF OFF DELIVERIES AND OVERSEERS OF OIL LOADINGS, RESPECTIVELY. END NOTE.). IN ALL, THE NUMBER OF HUMANITARIAN WORKERS WITHDRAWING WOULD TOTAL 195.

-- ANNAN SAID THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN STAFF WOULD LEAD TO THE SUSPENSION OF OIL-FOR-FOOD, WHICH COULD NO LONGER OPERATE WITHOUT PERSONNEL TO VERIFY OIL LIFTINGS OR OFF DELIVERIES AND DISTRIBUTION.

-- THE SYG STRESSED THAT UN ACTION ON OFF WAS A SUSPENSION, NOT A CANCELLATION, AS THE LATTER WOULD REQUIRE A UNSC DECISION.

-- WEAPONS INSPECTIONS WOULD ALSO BE SUSPENDED, WITH 130 UNMOVIC AND 5 IAEA INSPECTORS BEING WITHDRAWN.

-- UNIKOM MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WOULD ALSO BE INSTRUCTED TO WITHDRAW (MORE DETAILS SEPTTEL).

-- THE SYG SAID A LETTER WOULD BE FORTHCOMING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT, LISTING THESE STEPS AND EXPRESSING THE NEED TO CONTINUE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.

RUSSIA: MOVE FORWARD PROGRAM OF WORK,
BUT NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE OFFERED

¶12. (C) RUSSIAN PERMREP LAVROV EXPLAINED THE PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN THE MARCH 15 JOINT RUSSIAN - GERMAN - FRENCH DECLARATION. HE STRESSED THAT THE DOCUMENT COULD "SPEAK FOR ITSELF" SINCE INSPECTIONS WERE UNDERWAY AND YIELDING RESULTS. IN CONTRAST TO THE AZORES STATEMENTS, RUSSIA "TAKES A DIFFERENT APPROACH BASED ON CONCRETE FACTS, THAT INSPECTIONS ARE WORKING;" IRAQ HAD TAKEN POSITIVE STEPS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE REMAINING DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS. IN THAT CONTEXT, LAVROV LOOKED FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE DRAFT WORK PROGRAM LATER TODAY PER BLIX'S EARLIER PROMISE TO HAVE IT COMPLETED. FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND GERMANY ALL BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HOLD A MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL TO APPROVE THE WORK PROGRAM, AND HE REQUESTED THAT THE COUNCIL SET A DATE SOON SO THAT THE MINISTERIAL COULD TAKE PLACE, PREFERABLY EITHER TUESDAY AFTERNOON ON WEDNESDAY MORNING, SINCE IT WAS "CLEAR WE CAN'T DELAY."

FRANCE: MORE OF THE SAME, BUT YOU CAN'T BLAME FRANCE

¶13. (C) PERMREP DE LA SABLIERE SAID THAT HE HAD A "STRANGE FEELING THIS MORNING, WHICH PERHAPS OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS SHARED." HE HAD THOUGHT THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD BE DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT, "TO WHICH ALL ARE DEDICATED," BUT "MUCH TO MY SURPRISE," HE HAD LEARNED PUBLICLY THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION HAD BEEN "WITHDRAWN." OF COURSE, THE CO-SPONSORS COULD DO AS THEY SEE FIT, BUT THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT HAVE LEARNED THAT THE RESOLUTION HAD BEEN "WITHDRAWN" OUTSIDE A COUNCIL SETTING. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHEREBY THE INSPECTIONS WERE MAKING PROGRESS TOWARDS ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT IN A "LIMITED TIMEFRAME," FRANCE COULD NOT SUPPORT A PROPOSAL THAT AUTHORIZED USE OF FORCE. WHILE THE CO-SPONSORS HAD "PUT FORTH" THAT A PARTICULAR DELEGATION -- "I BELIEVE MINE" -- HAD MADE CLEAR IT WOULD OPPOSE A DRAFT AUTHORIZING THE USE OF FORCE, THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD NOT HAVE ACHIEVED A MAJORITY VOTE; WITHOUT A MAJORITY, A "NO" VOTE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A "VETO" UNDER THE CHARTER, HE STATED. THE DISCUSSIONS HELD DURING THE LAST WEEK HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE MAJORITY OF COUNCIL MEMBERS COULD NOT SUPPORT A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE USE OF FORCE, FOR THEY REMAINED COMMITTED TO PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT.

¶14. (C) LA SABLIERE SAID THAT THE COUNCIL WAS COLLECTIVELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS "BINDING" RESOLUTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ. THE INSPECTORS WERE TELLING THE COUNCIL THAT DISARMAMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED PEACEFULLY, HE STRESSED. HE WAS THUS INTERESTED IN THE DRAFT WORK PROGRAM AND KRDTs, WHICH HE BELIEVED SHOULD BE APPROVED ON MARCH 19 AT A MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AS A FINAL COUNCIL DISCUSSION. THERE WAS CONVICTION IN THE COUNCIL THAT BENCHMARKS, KRDTs, AND AN INSPECTOR-PROPOSED TIMEFRAME OF ONE OR TWO MONTHS COULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION, WITHOUT THE AUTOMATICITY "CONTEMPLATED BY SOME, BUT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT FOR THE MAJORITY OF DELEGATIONS." THE USE OF FORCE WITHOUT COUNCIL APPROVAL WAS NOT JUSTIFIED, GIVEN PROGRESS MADE IN INSPECTIONS, HE REPEATED. THE COUNCIL COULD CONTINUE TO WORK ON THE BASIS "DESIRED BY THE MAJORITY OF THE UN AND THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD." IN A SEPARATE INTERVENTION, LA SABLIERE POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS NOT FOR THE COUNCIL TO DECIDE THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN STAFF. HE PLACED FULL TRUST IN THE SYG TO MAKE THE DECISION ON "TEMPORARY" WITHDRAWAL, BUT NOTED THAT FRANCE WAS IN FAVOR CONTINUING INSPECTIONS.

CHINA: STILL NEED MAXIMUM EFFORT

¶15. (C) CHINESE PERMREP WANG STATED CHINA BELIEVED THAT AS LONG AS THERE WAS ONE PERCENT HOPE, THE COUNCIL SHOULD MAKE THE EFFORT TO CONTINUE INSPECTIONS. WANG SUPPORTED THE FRENCH, RUSSIAN, AND GERMAN MARCH 15 JOINT STATEMENT AND EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE MARCH 19 MINISTERIAL-LEVEL MEETING TO DISCUSS THE INSPECTORS' WORK PROGRAM. HE NOTED THE "WITHDRAWAL" OF THE CO-SPONSORS DRAFT RESOLUTION, AND EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS GOOD IF THE DECISION INDICATED THAT THERE WAS HOPE FOR CONSENSUS ON A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. IF THIS DECISION SIGNIFIED A PATH TO WAR, THEN IT WAS "VERY REGRETTABLE" BECAUSE CHINA BELIEVED THAT THE REALIZATION OF PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT WAS STILL POSSIBLE. IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL SIDES TO CONTINUE INSPECTIONS AND AVOID WAR. ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN PERSONNEL FROM IRAQ, CHINA WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF PERSONNEL, AND RESPECTED THE SYG'S DECISION IN THAT REGARD.

GERMANY: ON TO 1284, CONSENSUS NOT EQUAL TO UNANIMITY

¶16. (C) GERMAN PERMREP PLEUGER AGREED WITH RUSSIAN PERMREP LAVROV'S STATEMENTS REGARDING THE MARCH 15 JOINT DECLARATION. HE STRESSED THAT GERMANY STILL BELIEVED THAT THE COUNCIL COULD ACHIEVE THE GOAL OF PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT, AND THAT THE "VAST MAJORITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS WANTED ANOTHER TRY

AT ACHIEVING PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT." CONSENSUS DOES NOT MEAN UNANIMITY, HE STATED. PLEUGER EMPHASIZED THAT HE "COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT THE COUNCIL CONSENSUS WAS NOT IN LINE WITH UNSCR 1441" AS POSITED BY THE CO-SPONSORS. ALL THOSE THAT WERE OPPOSED TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION "WERE NOT OUTSIDE 1441." ON THE CONTRARY, THESE MEMBERS WANTED PEACE BASED ON UNSCRS 1441 AND 1284. AT THIS POINT, IT WOULD NOT MAKE SENSE TO SUSPEND INSPECTIONS, HE STRESSED. BLIX HAD PREPARED THE DRAFT WORK PROGRAM AND THE KRDTs. MINISTERS COULD ACHIEVE CONSENSUS BY MEETING TO APPROVE THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH WERE "NOT THAT DIFFERENT" FROM THE UK BENCHMARKS. THE SYG WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF UN STAFF; THEREFORE, GERMANY WOULD SUPPORT ANY DECISION HE MADE ON UN WITHDRAWAL.

SPAIN: 1441 IN ENTIRETY, CAN'T BE SELECTIVE

¶16. (C) SPANISH PERMREP ARIAS CONCURRED WITH AMBASSADOR GREENSTOCK THAT THE CO-SPONSORS WOULD NOT PROCEED WITH THE VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION. BASED ON UNSCR 1441, READ AS A WHOLE, SPAIN HAD NOTED THAT IRAQ WAS IN MATERIAL BREACH. SOME MEMBERS HAD NOT READ UNSCR 1441 AS A WHOLE, BUT HAD A TENDENCY TO OMIT CERTAIN POINTS, FOR EXAMPLE, "ANY OMISSION OR FALSEHOOD" OR "NOT FULL COOPERATION" WOULD RESULT IN A MATERIAL BREACH. COUNCIL MEMBERS WERE PURSUING A DIFFICULT PHILOSOPHY BECAUSE WITHOUT MILITARY PRESSURE, THE INSPECTORS WOULD NOT BE IN IRAQ. MERE LANGUAGE WOULD NOT FUNCTION WITHOUT AN ULTIMATUM. LA SABLIERE SUGGESTED THAT THE CO-SPONSORS DID NOT HAVE THE MAJORITY OF VOTES. BUT WHETHER OR NOT THIS WAS THE CASE, THE FRENCH DELEGATION SAID IT WOULD VETO, AND THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

BULGARIA: SAD DAY FOR THE COUNCIL

¶17. (C) BULGARIAN PERMREP TAFROV STATED THAT IT WAS A "SAD DAY FOR THE UN AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL, SAD THAT IT WAS CLEARER THAN EVER THAT SECURITY COUNCIL DIVISIONS OVER THE IRAQ CRISIS WERE INSURMOUNTABLE." BULGARIA HAD ADVOCATED COUNCIL UNITY AND WAS CONCERNED OVER THE TREND IN THE COUNCIL TOWARD TWO RIGID POSITIONS ON IRAQ. THIS SPLIT SHOULD NOT HAVE DIVIDED THE COUNCIL ON ITS COMMON GOAL OF DISARMAMENT. BULGARIA SUPPORTED THE UK PROPOSAL, BELIEVING THAT IT PROVIDED THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF COMPROMISE FOR COUNCIL UNITY. CERTAIN DELEGATIONS REJECTED THE PROPOSAL. THE DIVISIONS IN THE COUNCIL LIKELY WOULD REMAIN FOR DAYS AND EVEN WEEKS, BUT COUNCIL MEMBERS SHOULD NOT RESORT TO "MUTUAL RECRIMINATION." DIFFERENCES IN THE COUNCIL WERE NOT "INSURMOUNTABLE," AS LONG AS COUNCIL MEMBERS HAD THE POLITICAL DETERMINATION TO TAKE "ONE LAST STEP." IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, BULGARIA WAS OPEN TO ANY PROPOSAL THAT COULD RESTORE COUNCIL UNITY.

¶18. (C) FOR THE MOMENT, THE COUNCIL SHOULD FOCUS ON THE MAIN ISSUE OF THE FUTURE OF THE UN AS AN "ESSENTIAL INSTITUTION FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE VERY INCARNATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF MULTILATERALISM IN WORLD AFFAIRS." IT WAS CRITICAL FOR THE COUNCIL TO RESTORE ITS CENTRAL ROLE ON THE ISSUE OF IRAQ, AND CONTINUE DIALOGUE. THE COUNCIL, HOWEVER, NEEDED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND WITH REGARD TO THE SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL. BULGARIA WOULD HEED ADVICE ON UN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SYG AND THE CHIEF INSPECTOR.

PAKISTAN: THE ART OF SAYING LITTLE

¶19. (C) IN WHAT HAS BECOME TYPICAL OF HIS INTERVENTIONS IN THE COUNCIL ON THE SUBJECT OF IRAQ, PAKISTANI PERMREP AKRAM CAUTIOUSLY AVOIDED MAKING CHOOSING SIDES IN THE DEBATE, SAYING IT WAS CLEAR THE COUNCIL WAS AT AN IMPASSE. PAKISTAN HAD SOUGHT "FULL AND FAITHFUL" IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCRS AS THE SOLUTION TO IRAQ'S WMD, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. DISARMAMENT BY PEACEFUL MEANS HAD ALWAYS BEEN A STRONG PREFERENCE. PAKISTAN HAVE ALSO BELIEVED IN THE UNITY OF THE

SECURITY COUNCIL IN ACHIEVING THESE OBJECTIVES, BUT UNFORTUNATELY THE COUNCIL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND CONVERGENCE IN ANY OF THE PROPOSALS WHICH HAD BEEN TABLED BY MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. THAT SAID, PAKISTAN BELIEVED THAT TIME AND SPACE FOR DIPLOMACY DID NOT END, AND DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS MUST CONTINUE TO BE EXPLORED IN ORDER TO FIND A UNITED STAND. THE COUNCIL SHOULD RECEIVE THE PROGRAM OF WORK WHILE CONTINUING TO URGE A RESPONSE FROM THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES EVEN AT THIS LATE DATE.

CHILE, MEXICO: (TYPICALLY OF LATE) UNHELPFUL

¶20. (C) CHILEAN PERMREP VALDES AGREED THAT IT WAS A SAD DAY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, "GIVEN THAT THE INSPECTIONS ARE STRENGTHENED AND MORE EFFECTIVE DAILY... THEY COULD HAVE ACHIEVED THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ, AND CHANGED THE DYNAMIC THERE," WHICH HE ASSERTED WOULD HAVE LED TO GREATER DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ. CHILE REGRETTED THAT ITS PROPOSAL TO BRIDGE DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE P-5 HAD BEEN REJECTED BEFORE IT WAS FULLY CIRCULATED FOR CONSIDERATION. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO "MAINTAIN A CONSTRUCTIVE CLIMATE" IN THE COUNCIL, HE WARNED MEMBERS AGAINST RECRIMINATIONS. CHILE SUPPORTED THE PRESENTATION OF THE PROGRAM OF WORK, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS "NO REASON" TO IGNORE THE SERIOUS SITUATION ON THE SECURITY OF IRAQ AND THE SYG'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW UN PERSONNEL.

¶21. (C) MEXICAN PERMREP AGUILAR-ZINSER MADE A CHARACTERISTICALLY LONG INTERVENTION, ECHOING PREVIOUS POINTS MADE IN THE COUNCIL, OUTLINING MEXICO'S INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UN CHARTER. HE REGRETTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO UNANIMOUS DECISION WHICH WOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE COUNCIL TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ, AND, RECALLING 1441, REGRETTED THAT THE CONCLUSION HAD NOT BEEN TO SEEK A UNANIMOUS DECISION ON PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT. MEXICO HAD CAREFULLY EXAMINED THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORTH BY THE U.S., UK AND SPAIN AS CO-SPONSORS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. FURTHER, MEXICO SHARED BILATERAL COMMITMENTS THAT RELATED TO COMMON SECURITY "WITH ONE CO-SPONSOR WITH WHOM WE SHARE GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY AND POLICY GOALS;" MEXICO WOULD DEFEND THE IMMEDIATE SPHERE OF SECURITY TOGETHER WITH THAT PARTNER.

¶22. (C) WITH RESPECT TO THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ, HOWEVER, MEXICO BASED ITS POSITION ON THE CONVICTION THAT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK WITH FULL AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE. WHILE MEXICO HAD NEITHER "ARSENALS NOR STRATEGIC PROJECTS NOR FINANCIAL INTERESTS GLOBALLY," ITS EXTERNAL POLICIES WERE FOUNDED ON THEIR CONSTITUTION WHICH REGULATED ITS BEHAVIOR. PRESIDENT FOX HAD SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED HIS FOREIGN MINISTER AND PERMREP TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION: ONE REQUIRED PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITH FORCE ONLY BROUGHT AT THE FINAL MOMENT, AND ANOTHER REQUIRED THAT THE THREAT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED AS SUCH BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL "AS THE SOLE BODY AUTHORIZED TO DECLARE THE USE OF SUCH FORCE." HOPE WAS NOT YET EXHAUSTED, AND THUS "THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF FORCE IN DISARMING IRAQ." THE PRECEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UN CHARTER SET FORTH THE CONDITIONS FOR USE OF FORCE; MEXICO DID NOT SEE THAT THOSE CONDITIONS HAD BEEN MET. THE SECURITY COUNCIL CANNOT RELINQUISH AUTHORITY HERE, FOR MAJORITIES -- WHETHER OR NOT UNANIMOUS -- ALSO HAVE THE AUTHORITY OF COLLECTIVE WILL. SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST DISARM, MUST ABIDE BY THE RELEVANT UNSCRS, AND CANNOT THREATEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. IN THAT CONTEXT, MEXICO SUPPORTED THE DRAFT PROGRAM OF WORK, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A STANDARD TO DISARMAMENT EFFORTS, HE CONCLUDED.

ANGOLA, CAMEROON, GUINEA: REGRETFUL,
BUT STILL TINGED WITH HOPE

¶23. (C) ANGOLAN PERMREP GASPAR-MARTINS SAID THAT THE BLIX AND EL-BARADEI REPORTS TO THE COUNCIL HAD MADE CLEAR THAT INSPECTIONS WERE PRODUCING SOME RESULTS IN THE ATTEMPT TO

DISARM IRAQ, BUT THOSE RESULTS WERE NOT SATISFACTORY TO EVERY MEMBER. ALTHOUGH ALL PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS HAD TO BE EXHAUSTED BEFORE MOVING TO WAR, THAT SEEMED TO BE THE SITUATION FACING THE COUNCIL. IN THAT CONTEXT, HE PAID TRIBUTE TO THE MOST RECENT UK EFFORT, BUT "EVEN THAT" DID NOT WORK. WAR CAUSED UNTOLD SUFFERING, AND IF THE COUNCIL COULD AVOID A DECISION HAVING TO UPHOLD WAR, IT SHOULD DO SO. ON A PRACTICAL NOTE, GASPAR-MARTINS SUGGESTED THAT SOME TIME SHOULD ELAPSE BEFORE HOLDING ANOTHER MINISTERIAL MEETING, "TO LET THINGS CALM DOWN." IF GOVERNMENTS MIGHT BE CONVINCED OF MOVING FORWARD ON THE DRAFT PROGRAM OF WORK WITH THE FULL COMMITMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HOWEVER, THEN THE ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO DO SO.

¶24. (C) CAMEROONIAN PERMREP BELINGA-EBOUTOU AGREED THAT THE COUNCIL WAS FORCED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE LIMITS OF DIPLOMACY IN MANAGING THE IRAQI CRISIS. DESPITE THE DRAMATIC EVENTS OF THE PREVIOUS 48 HOURS IN THE CAR, THE COUNCIL HAD NOT REGISTERED THAT CRISIS; THIS SIMPLE FACT SUPPORTED HIS ASSERTION. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE COUNCIL'S DISUNITY WAS A "DISSERVICE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND MULTILATERALISM," AND APPEALED FOR THE P-5 TO CAUCUS AND SORT OUT THEIR DIFFERENCES. THE SIX HAD PROPOSED ELEMENTS FOR A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT THAT HAD BEEN REJECTED, BUT WHICH REMAINED ON THE TABLE. HE CONCLUDED THAT "A MIRACLE" COULD NOT YET BE RULED OUT.

¶25. (C) GUINEAN PERMREP TRAORE, COUNCIL PRESIDENT FOR MARCH, SAID THAT GUINEA HAD SPARED NO EFFORT TO FIND A COMPROMISE THAT WOULD BE HEAL THE DEADLOCK IN THE COUNCIL. HOWEVER, THE FRENCH - GERMAN - RUSSIAN DECLARATION OF MARCH 15 AND THE AZORES SUMMIT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE COUNCIL WAS "MORE DIVIDED THAN EVER." ALL WILL LOSE WITHOUT SOME COMPROMISE, HE WARNED; HE HOPED SOME COMPROMISE SOLUTION COULD STILL BE FOUND.

SYRIA: DEADLOCK

¶26. (C) SYRIAN PERMREP WEHBE SAID THAT THE COUNCIL HAD "TRULY REACHED A STATE OF COMPLETE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN IRAQ," WITH THE U.S. INFORMING UNMOVIC AND THE IAEA TO EVACUATE, THE INSPECTORS' WITHDRAWAL, AND THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE AZORES. THE COUNCIL HAD REACHED DEADLOCK, BUT THERE WAS STILL ANOTHER COURSE: THE PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ. THE COUNCIL AGREED UNDER UNSCR 1441 THAT THE AIMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD BE TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT. UNSCRS 1284 AND 1441 ESTABLISHED UNMOVIC AND REINFORCED THE INSPECTIONS SYSTEM. IRAQ WAS COOPERATING ON PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE; IT MADE POSITIVE EFFORTS TO DESTROY WEAPONS, AND HAD PRODUCED REPORTS ON ANTHRAX AND VX. NOW THE COUNCIL HAD "GREATER DETERMINATION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR WORK UNDER 1441" AND CONTINUED COUNCIL UNITY BECAUSE THE INSPECTORS WERE READY TO PRESENT A WORK PROGRAM AND KRDTs. WEHBE SUPPORTED LAVROV'S PROPOSAL TO HEAR THE WORK PROGRAM ON MARCH 19 TO "LEAD TOWARDS ADDITIONAL PEACEFUL ACTION."

NEGROPONTE